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Abstract: Switzerland’s employment growth since the early 2000s was very high
in both historical and international perspective, despite solid real wage
increases and only moderate GDP growth. Yet, the reasons for the remarkable
creation of jobs are largely unknown. We aim at filling this gap by studying the
underlying characteristics and drivers of the Swiss “job miracle”. We first outline
the characteristics of the “job miracle” and show that the observed job growth
correlates with a substantial increase in the labor intensity of economic activity.
We then discuss five potential drivers of the unprecedented employment growth,
which are consistent with the facts. Our empirical results suggest that immigra-
tion was the key factor in explaining the “job miracle” as it raised local demand
and thereby triggered the creation of additional jobs.
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1 Introduction
The term ‘Swiss “job miracle”’ denotes the phenomenon that in the last decade
total hours worked in Switzerland have grown substantially. Between 2003 and
2013, the number of employees increased by 15.2 percent, from 4.2 to 4.8 million
persons. The job creation in this period not only represents a substantial change
from the preceding decade, in which employment in Switzerland stagnated; it is
also high from an international perspective. Figure 1 compares Switzerland’s
growth in total hours worked with that of other developed countries. It shows
that Switzerland’s increase in total hours worked was especially remarkable in
the period between 2005 and 2011. Amongst the countries considered, in the
period under consideration only Sweden displays similar long-term increases in
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employment.1 Germany, for which the recent surge in employment has been the
subject of several studies,2 had lower employment growth than Switzerland
throughout this period.
The Swiss “job miracle” of the last decade is all the more remarkable
considering that growth in GDP has not been impressively high in recent
years,3 that Swiss firms’ competitiveness strongly decreased by a substantial
and fast real appreciation of the Swiss franc of more than 15 percent of the real
trade-weighted exchange rate between 2009 and 2013, and that the US had the
opposite problem after the Great Recession: GDP growth without job growth.4
This paper is the first to describe the Swiss “job miracle” and to provide a
qualitative assessment of its possible causes. Our first contribution is to establish
the most important characteristics of the “job miracle”. We show that new jobs
were mainly created in the knowledge-intensive service sector and were almost
entirely filled by workers with high observed formal qualifications. We also show
Figure 1: Total hours worked for selected OECD countries (2002–2013).
Source: OECD, own calculations.
1 There are only four countries among the OECD countries with higher growth in total hours
worked between 2002 and 2012: Australia, Israel, Luxembourg, and Mexico. Only Luxembourg
and Australia have a level of development comparable to the one of Switzerland.
2 See e. g. DUSTMANN ET AL. (2014) and the literature cited therein.
3 As a result, the growth rate of labor productivity in Switzerland between 2000 and 2010 was,
in a historical perspective, unprecedentedly low (SIEGENTHALER, 2014).
4 See e. g. FREEMAN (2013).
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that observers of economic activity did not foresee the “job miracle”. Modifying
the analysis in an earlier paper (GRAFF, MANNINO, and SIEGENTHALER 2012) by referring
to a more adequate reference, we demonstrate that the two most important
forecasting institutions in Switzerland, the KOF Swiss Economic Institute (KOF)
and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), systematically and repeat-
edly underestimated the growth of the number of jobs. Moreover, using a decom-
position of Swiss GDP growth into the contributions of capital deepening, growth
of hours worked and labor productivity growth, we show that the “job miracle” is
related to the fact that around 2000 GDP growth became remarkably more labor-
and less capital-intensive. These changes are also detected in rolling window
regressions as partial correlations between investment, labor productivity and
employment growth.
Our second contribution is to present and assess five potential structural
causes of the Swiss “job miracle” that are consistent with a shift towards a more
labor-intensive GDP growth: (1) catch-up employment growth after an unusually
long and turbulent phase of economic stagnation in the 1990s, (2) the evolution
of the price of labor relative to the price of capital, (3) a labor supply and labor
cost shock due to the introduction of a free movement of persons regime with
the EU and EFTA countries aligning labor supply with the increasingly skill-
intensive labor demand of firms, (4) increased settlements of foreign firms
caused among others by substantially reduced corporate and income taxes,
and (5) jobs created in the wake of migration into Switzerland through local
multiplier effects on domestic demand. While we cannot exactly pin down the
quantitative relevance of each of these factors in accounting for the Swiss “job
miracle”, our empirical analysis suggests that immigration was a key driver. Not
only was immigration a pre-requirement for it – as the resident labor force
would not have been sufficiently large to fill all new jobs created – but it also
reinforced the “job miracle” by fueling local job growth through increasing local
demand for goods and services.
Our analyses are relevant for at least three reasons. First, as we will show,
low wage growth cannot account for the Swiss “job miracle”. This warrants
explanation, as wage moderation might be considered the natural candidate for
explaining strong employment growth under relatively moderate GDP growth.
Second, understanding the potential reasons for the “job miracle” helps to
assess the reasons behind the systematic forecast errors in Switzerland. Third,
understanding the Swiss “job miracle” is relevant to comprehend the recent
immigration wave to Switzerland, which in turn is important because immigra-
tion has become an increasingly hot topic in Switzerland, with growing opposi-
tion among residents against free migration from EU/EFTA countries, while the
majority of newly created jobs were filled by immigrants.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section,
we highlight important characteristics of the “job miracle” and demonstrate the
extent to which forecasters have underestimated the job growth. This section
also takes a closer look at the structural changes in the nature of Swiss GDP
growth that occurred around 2000. Section 3 provides a narrative account of the
potential sources of the Swiss “job miracle”. Section 4 concludes.
2 The unexpected Swiss “job miracle”
2.1 Characteristics of the “job miracle”
The Swiss “job miracle” refers to the growth of total hours worked. Figure 2
shows total hours worked and an index of real wages from 1950 to 2013.5
The hours worked series suggests that after a recovery from crisis of the
1980s, the 1990s mostly saw a decline; but in the late 1990s it started to rise. It
gained momentum around 2004, and it has since then evolved on a steep
growth path.6 Remarkably, growth in hours worked in the latest period was as
high as it had been in the early 1960s, despite the fact that GDP grew on average
nearly three percentage points less.
Three characteristics of the “job miracle” are especially noteworthy. First,
moderate wage growth cannot account for the “job miracle”. First evidence
supporting this view is presented in Figure 2. Using the Swiss wage index, it
shows that real wages grew at similar rates between 2002 and 2013 as in the two
decades before. There is no apparent slowdown in real wage growth around
2004, i. e. at the time when employment begins to surge.
Further evidence that wages cannot explain the “job miracle” is presented in
Figure 3.7 It shows the evolution of competition-weighted relative unit labor
5 The hours worked data are from SIEGENTHALER (2014), extrapolated to 2013 using the official
time series on total hours worked from the Federal Statistical Office (FSO). The Swiss wage
index is also published by the FSO.
6 The exact timing of the surge in employment slightly depends on the series looked at. For
instance, the surge occurs in 2003 according to the official hours worked series from the FSO. By
contrast, growth in full-time equivalent jobs (which is the reference series shown in Figure 6)
leveled off only in 2005.
7 The evolution of Switzerland’s labor share of income also suggests that average wages cannot
account for the “job miracle”. Switzerland’s labor share has remained remarkably stable, which
is in contrast to the decreases in labor shares observed in most other developed countries (see
SIEGENTHALER and STUCKI, 2015, and GRAFF and SIEGENTHALER, 2014).
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costs for Switzerland, Germany, the United States and the euro area (comprising
its present 18 countries) from 1998–2013. These series relate a country’s unit
labor costs to a weighted average of the unit labor costs of a country’s main
competitors on its domestic market and its export markets, using respective
Figure 3: Competition-weighted relative unit labor costs for selected OECD countries (1998–2015).
Source: OECD.
Figure 2: Total hours worked and real wages in Switzerland (1950–2013).
Source: SIEGENTHALER (2014) and Swiss Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
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trade shares as weights. They thus reflect the joint effects of changes in unit
labor costs, labor productivities and nominal exchange rates on the price com-
petitiveness of a country relative to its competitors. (An increase in the index
mirrors a decline in competitiveness.)
The unit labor costs series for Switzerland shows no remarkable deviations
from the series of the other countries until about 2008. Henceforth, however, the
index for Switzerland first rose pronouncedly and then stayed at outstandingly
high levels, whereas it remained more or less constant, or dropped, for the other
countries. Conventional economic wisdom would now expect that the loss in price
competitiveness on international goods and services markets had depressed
Swiss employment. Along these lines, the improvement of labor market conditions
in Germany over the last ten years, for example, is frequently attributed to wage
restraint and the resulting export boom.8 The same cannot be claimed for
Switzerland, especially not since 2008, when Swiss employment growth has
been particularly substantial in international perspective.
A second characteristic of the “job miracle” is that most new jobs were
created in the service sector. Figure 4 gives an overview of the industries which
account for the change in employment observed between 2002 and 2013. It
shows the cumulative change in the number of employees in six different
economic sectors.
Figure 4: Cumulative change in employment by industry (2002–2013).
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
8 The paper of DUSTMANN ET AL. (2014) on the German labor market miracle shows a graph similar
to our Figure 3.
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As is evident from the figure, market-oriented, knowledge-intensive private
sector service activities as well as public sector employment account for the
largest part of the “job miracle”. Other sectors contributing positively to the “job
miracle” were the construction sector and, since 2007, also other service indus-
tries (especially wholesale trade and transportation). On the other hand, employ-
ment in manufacturing and agriculture stagnated.
These observations raise two questions. First, does the “job miracle” merely
represent an inefficient and non-sustainable shift toward more state employ-
ment, as many concerned observers of the Swiss economy are claiming? In our
view, this is not the case. To start with, according to Figure 4, growth in the
(broadly defined) public sector only accounts for roughly one third of total
employment growth. Second, a closer inspection of the detailed sources of the
public sector employment growth suggest that it is mainly demand-driven, i. e.
the increase in public sector employment can arguably be explained to a large
extent by population growth, demographic ageing, the shift of Switzerland
towards a knowledge economy, increased demand for health care, and a grow-
ing labor force participation of women.9
A second question raised by the above observations is whether the Swiss
“job miracle” is a mere consequence of the ongoing structural shift toward the
service sector, which is observed in many developed countries. Yet, as “tertiar-
ization” is a continuous and gradual process that has been going on for many
decades, it may have reinforced the Swiss “job miracle”, but it cannot explain its
timing: Tertiarization in Switzerland was particularly pronounced in the 1990s,
in which total hours worked in Switzerland decreased. Moreover, tertiarization is
observed in many developed countries that have stagnant employment.
The third important element of the Swiss “job miracle” is that the new jobs
are nearly entirely filled by workers with high formal qualifications. Figure 5
illustrates this point by showing the number of employees in Switzerland
according to their highest educational attainment. In particular, between 2002
and 2014 the number of tertiary employees in Switzerland increased by 736,000.
In the same period, the number of non-tertiary educated employees declined.
The shift towards high-skilled employment growth around 1998 is particularly
9 First, according to the Job Statistics around one fifth of the growth of the public sector
between 2002 and 2013 is accounted for by employment growth in education. Second, approxi-
mately one third of the state sector growth occurs in residential care and social work activities.
The largest part of the job growth in these areas arises in old age and care homes (especially for
disadvantaged) as well as child- and daycare centers. Finally, another third of the public sector
growth arises in health care, in which in the number of jobs in general and specialty hospitals,
but also the number of medical specialists increased.
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pronounced for the educational credentials of immigrants over time (SECO, BFM,
BFS, and BSV 2014).
2.2 Forecasters’ systematic underestimation of job growth
The strong job growth in Switzerland since 2002 took observers of economic
activity by surprise. In fact, as GRAFF, MANNINO, and SIEGENTHALER (2012) have
shown, the two most prominent institutions that are forecasting employment
growth in Switzerland – the KOF Swiss Economic Institute at ETH Zürich (KOF)
and a group of experts under the guidance of the State Secretariat for Economic
Affairs (SECO) – delivered systematically downward biased forecasts for an
extended period.
Here, we replicate this analysis, referring to a more appropriate reference
series.10 The series that both KOF and SECO are forecasting is seasonally
adjusted full-time equivalent jobs (FTE) according to the Swiss Job Statistics.
Figure 6 shows several vintages of this series.
Figure 5: Employment in Switzerland by highest educational attainment (1996–2014).
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
10 GRAFF, MANNINO, and SIEGENTHALER (2012) evaluated the job forecasts with the ex-post data as
reference series, which is not an entirely appropriate benchmark, as the forecasters aimed at the
reference series at hand in real time. The forecasts thus could not know that due to the FSO
sampling procedure both level and trend of their reference series would later be be revised
upward. We are grateful to Benjamin Weber for directing our attention to this point.
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The figure illustrates that in the period under consideration, the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office (FSO) revised the FTE jobs series five times. The solid line,
spanning the whole period from 1991 to 2012, is the latest plotted vintage of FTE
jobs, and the one that was used as benchmark in GRAFF, MANNINO, and
SIEGENTHALER (2012). Clearly, this series lies above most of the previously pub-
lished vintages, sometimes up to 3 percent; and the growth rates of the latest
series exceed those of the earlier vintages, too.11 Since the earlier vintages reflect
the target that forecasters were aiming at in real time, we construct a synthetic
reference series based on a spline of the six different vintages of the Job
Statistics shown in Figure 6, and redo the forecast evaluation exercise of
GRAFF, MANNINO, and SIEGENTHALER (2012). As in the earlier study, the evaluation
is made with reference to quarter-on-quarter growth rates rather than numbers
Figure 6: Reference series: full-time equivalent jobs in Switzerland (1991–2012).
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
11 With the exception of the shift in 2010, the breaks and shifts in the series are not due to
changes in definitions or concepts applied. Rather, the breaks result from the fact that the
universe from which firms were sampled to participate in the Job Statistics regularly proved to
be unrepresentative for the actual universe of firms in Switzerland. This prove came as soon as
the FSO conducted a new business census in order to update its universe of firms. In order to fit
the old series to the new (and generally higher) benchmark of the census, the FSO increased the
trend growth rate of the old vintage while imposing the cyclical pattern of the old vintage on the
new series.
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of FTE jobs.12 As we move from one to another reference series, we refer to the
growth rates (but not the levels) of the revised series.13
Table 1 provides our evaluation of the KOF forecasts for the period 1998q1–
2011q4 using the new reference series.14 It shows the root mean squared error
(RMSE), the mean error (ME), and the mean absolute error (MAE) as well as the
R2, i. e. the share of variation in the reference series explained by the forecasts.
The table illustrates that KOF faced substantial difficulty even to nowcast FTE
job growth, let alone to forecast it. The mean error of the 41 KOF nowcasts in this
period is 0.13 percentage points. This implies a substantial bias of the nowcasts,
since according to our reference series FTE jobs grew on average 0.18 percent
from one quarter to the other; and as expected, the errors are getting larger for
the one-to four-quarter-ahead forecasts. Generally, the table illustrates that the
KOF employment forecasts were strikingly inaccurate, even for nowcasts and
short forecast horizons, and practically useless as the forecast horizon
approached one year.
Table 1: Accuracy statistics of the KOF full-time equivalent job forecasts.
Statistics t+ t+ t+ t + t+
RMSE . . . . .
ME . . . . .
MAE . . . . .
R . . . . .
Notes: t + h denotes a forecast horizon of h quarters. Accordingly, t+0 represents
nowcasts and t+h means h-quarter-ahead forecasts. The forecast accuracy statis-
tics relates to quarterly growth rates. The total sample comprises 41 observations
(for nowcasts). It is reduced by h for forecasts.
12 The reason is that it proved difficult to identify when exactly the forecasters switched to the
new benchmark numbers. This implies that despite our efforts to construct a synthetic reference
series, we might evaluate forecasts using a wrong benchmark series at the transition points. As
in GRAFF, MANNINO, and SIEGENTHALER (2012), we thus evaluate the forecasts referring to quarter-on-
quarter growth rates, since the growth rates of the series are less affected by the benchmark
revisions than the level of the series.
13 For example, we evaluate the forecasts made in the third quarter of 2007 with the growth
rates from the revised series published posterior to the fourth quarter of 2007.
14 KOF published forecasts regarding both FTE jobs twice a year (in the first and third quarter)
until the third quarter of 2007. Since then, forecasts of FTE jobs are published on a quarterly
basis.
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The systematic bias in the KOF job growth forecasts is illustrated by Figure 7,
which displays the KOF two-step-ahead forecast errors and, to ease the inter-
pretation, a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) low-pass filtered series of these errors. The
HP-trend shows that the positive bias in the KOF forecasts arises around 2005
and remains fairly stable over the rest of the sample period. Indeed, from mid-
2005 onward, KOF overestimated job growth only four times, but underesti-
mated it 25 times. (Similar pictures emerge for KOF forecasts with other forecast
horizons.)
Notably, the KOF forecasters were not the only ones to be repeatedly
surprised by the job growth in Switzerland. The same applies to the other
important forecasting institution in Switzerland, SECO. Its job growth forecasts
are published quarterly, relating to FTE jobs in the current year. They are
available from the third quarter of 2001 onward and can thus be compared
with the reference series from 2001q3 until 2012q4. Figure 8 shows the SECO
forecast of annual growth in FTE jobs made in the first and the third quarter of
the respective year. For the sake of comparability, the KOF forecasts and the
reference series are expressed in terms of annual growth rates, too.
The figure demonstrates that from about 2005 onward the SECO forecasters
also started to underestimate the growth in FTE jobs substantially. Overall, even
with a synthetic reference series that reflects the real time knowledge of the
forecasters, our re-analysis confirms the earlier findings of GRAFF, MANNINO, and
SIEGENTHALER (2012). Job growth forecasts in Switzerland had a substantial
Figure 7: KOF two-step-ahead forecast errors and HP filtered series (λ= 1,600).
Source: KOF, own calculations.
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negative bias for a considerable period of time. What we now call the Swiss “job
miracle” had then escaped the attention of researches.
2.3 The shift towards labor-intensive GDP growth
The systematically negative job growth forecast bias in the forecasts suggests a
structural break in the evolution of job growth, which escaped the forecasters’
attention. Indeed, in the transition to the new millennium the nature of GDP
growth in Switzerland changed. We demonstrate this referring to the standard
neoclassical decomposition of the growth of real GDP (Y) into the contributions
of real capital (K), labor (measured in total hours worked, L), and total factor
productivity (A)
Δyt = 1− sLð ÞΔkt + sLΔlt +Δat, [1]
where lowercase letters denote variables expressed in logs, sL stands for the
labor share of total income (Y) and the annual periodicity is indicated by the
subscript t. Figure 9 plots the results of this growth accounting decomposition
for the periods up to and since 2002, based on calculations provided by the FSO.
The striking message from the decomposition shown in Figure 9 is that
while capital accumulation accounted for about half of GDP growth in the
Figure 8: Synthetic reference series and KOF and SECO forecasts of Swiss FTEs job growth
(2001–2012).
Source: KOF, own calculations.
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1990s, its absolute and, in particular, its relative contribution to GDP growth in
the second period was clearly smaller. Conversely, while growth in labor input
contributed negatively to GDP growth in the 1990s, it was the main driver of GDP
growth after 2002.15 This growth decomposition thus indicates that in from about
1998 to 2002 economic activity in Switzerland became pronouncedly more labor-
intensive.16 In addition to this, comparative growth decompositions by the OECD
(2013, 25) show that the labor intensity of Switzerland’s GDP growth between
2007 and 2011 is also remarkable in an international perspective.17
Did the change in GDP growth also affect the series that are actually used to
produce job growth forecasts? To examine this question, we run rolling window
regressions of quarterly growth of FTE jobs of the following form:
Δlt = β0 + β1Δ y=lð Þt + β2 I=Yð Þt + et. [2]
Figure 9: Decomposition of Swiss annual GDP growth (1991−2010).
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
15 Qualitatively, this finding does not depend on 2002 as the exact year of the sample split. The
results are similar for a split in 2000 or even 1998.
16 A more detailed growth decomposition by RUDOLF and ZURLINDEN (2010) for the period 1991 to
2006 shows that the FSO decomposition in fact underestimates the contribution of labor,
especially in the second period, as it attributes the growth in the quality of labor to TFP growth,
which reinforces our argument.
17 Indeed, in the period from 2007 to 2011, Switzerland is the country with by far the largest
positive contribution of labor input to GDP growth amongst all 18 OECD countries considered in
the publication, while the contribution of capital is only average.
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The purpose of the regressions is to examine whether there are changes in the
contemporaneous partial correlations between FTE job growth (Δl), growth of
average labor productivity (Δ(y/l), defined as GDP growth per FTE job) and the
investment rate (I/Y, i. e. the ratio of machinery, equipment and buildings
investment to GDP). If, as indicated by the growth decompositions, the relation-
ships between the growth of employment, productivity and capital did change
over time, we should expect the partial correlations between the variables not to
be stable in rolling window regressions.
Figures 10 and 11 plot the point estimates of β1 and β2, respectively,
referring to a rolling window of 30 quarters along with the 95-percent confidence
intervals.18 The horizontal axis shows the respective end date of the rolling
window.
The first figure illustrates that, conditional on the investment rate, job
growth and average labor productivity growth were negatively associated
throughout the 1990s. The coefficient then increases in two relatively clear-cut
steps, and becomes positive. The confidence intervals confirm that this is a
statistically significant regime transfer: The trade-off between labor productivity
Figure 10: Partial correlation between job and labor productivity growth (1993–2013).
18 The choice of 30 quarters ensures that each window contains at least two phases of the
business cycle in the period examined. The results, however, do not depend on this choice in
qualitative terms.
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and job growth, which characterized the 1990s, disappeared around 2000.19 As a
result, productivity growth in Switzerland became less labor-saving.20
Figure 11 shows that, holding labor productivity growth constant, the invest-
ment rate and job growth have become more positively associated. Here, the
change of the point estimate over time, although visible, does not amount to a
statistically significant structural break. Having said this, the two figures taken
together confirm that while the employment forecasts became biased, the Swiss
economy underwent a structural change toward more labor intensity.
Considering the results presented in this section, any explanation of the
Swiss “job miracle” should be consistent with the following four facts:
1. Solid average wage growth.
2. A trend towards a higher labor intensity and a lower capital-intensity of
economic activity.
3. A disappearance of the trade-off between productivity and job growth.
4. A continuous shift in labor demand towards higher skills.
Figure 11: Partial correlation between job growth and the investment rate (1993–2013).
19 A similar pattern emerges if we correlate hours worked and TFP growth using the data
underlying Figure 9. The correlation between TFP growth and growth in hours worked is −0.40
from 1991 to 2001. From 2002 to 2010, conversely, the correlation is 0.47.
20 An alternative to the rolling regressions presented above would have been a formal test for a
structural break, where the timing is imposed exogenously or detected endogenously. However,
the advantage of the rolling regression approach is that it does not impose a binary distinction
(before and after a potential break), but allows to follow a potential structural transformation
through time, which is more informative.
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In the Appendix, we examine the extent to which these four factors account for
the forecast errors of KOF’s job growth forecasts. The analysis suggests that the
identified factors are relevant, as we can explain the bias and more than two
thirds of the job growth forecasts errors of KOF. We are thus confident to have
identified some key factors and relationships that escaped the attention of the
forecasters in real time.
3 Which factors explain the “job miracle”?
This section discusses potential driving forces behind the Swiss “job miracle”.
Although any factor leading to a dynamic economic development may have
contributed to it,21 we concentrate on factors that explain the “job miracle” and
that are consistent with the four facts developed in the last section. Most
importantly, we focus on factors that can potentially explain the structural
change toward more labor- and less capital-intensive economic dynamics.
Against this background, there are in our view five potential causes of the
“job miracle”.
3.1 Catch-up employment growth
A first potential driver of the “job miracle” is that employment in the early 2000s
arguably still was catching up after of a long phase of economic stagnation in
Switzerland between 1992 and 1996. In that period, employment had stagnated
unprecedentedly long, and substantial restructuring had taken place:
Unprofitable firms had gone bankrupt, employment in the industrial sector
had decreased strongly, and firms had intensified the implementation of labor
saving technologies.22 One consequence of this restructuring process was that
economic activity during the 1990s recession was characterized by capital dee-
pening rather than by an expansion of employment (as evidenced by Figure 9).
The second consequence was a substantially increased skill-intensity of labor
demand after the recession.23 As soon as the economy began to recover from the
21 Factors, which are therefore omitted from the analysis but may be important in explaining
part of the “job miracle” are, among others: the bilateral trade agreements with the EU/EFTA
states enacted in 2002, and the dynamic growth in certain important export regions in the
relevant years (e. g. Germany or China).
22 See LAMPART (2006), FRICK and LAMPART (2007) and SIEGENTHALER (2014).
23 See PUHANI (2003 and 2005), BOLLI and ZURLINDEN (2009) and SHELDON (2005).
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recession around 1997, firms predominantly hired skilled workers, which they
had been reluctant to engage during the long stagnation phase.24 The growth in
skilled employment after the long stagnation can explain why aggregate
employment growth became more compatible with productivity growth in this
period. Moreover, the catch-up of employment after the stagnation phase could
still have contributed to the job growth in the early phase of the “job miracle”,
as the catch-up employment growth was interrupted by an economic stagnation
between 2001 and 2003.
3.2 Moderate increases in the price of labor relative to capital
The second driver of the “job miracle”, until approximately 2007, may have been
the evolution of the price of labor relative to the main competing input factor,
capital. Although wage restraint does not account for the “job miracle”, wages
may thus nevertheless have played a role in the first half of the “job miracle”. If
the price of labor grows weakly relative to the price of capital, firms have an
incentive to invest into labor rather than capital. Figure 12 plots the average
annual growth rates of the relative factor price25 and total hours worked for four
periods since 1990.
The figure shows a negative relationship between the growth in the relative
factor price and total hours worked.26 The figure also shows a substantial
increase in the relative factor price for labor between 1990 and 1997, incentiviz-
ing firms to invest into labor-saving technologies and thus potentially depres-
sing growth in hours worked (LAMPART, 2006). The converse is observed in the
2000s: A distinctively slower increase of the relative factor price after 1997
reduced the impetus to invest in labor-saving capital and technology, and
therefore may have contributed to the “job miracle” in the initial phase.
24 In 1997, university graduates were 1.7 times over-represented among the registered unem-
ployed. In 2000, the fraction had decreased to 0.7; see FRICK and LAMPART (2007).
25 The relative factor price is computed as the Swiss wage index relative to the deflator of gross
private investment in machinery and equipment, taken from the national accounts.
26 Such a negative relationship is predicted by models of directed technical change such as the
one presented by ACEMOGLU (2003). In these models, relative supply and relative prices of factors
influence firms’ technology adaption and their direction of innovation. Following a similar
argument, PESSOA and VAN REENEN (2014) explained the recent slowdown in productivity growth
in the UK by declining real wages, increased real wage flexibility and increasing costs of capital,
incentivizing firms to invest into labor instead of capital.
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3.3 Free movement of persons
The third potential driver of the Swiss “job miracle” was the introduction of free
movement of persons (FMP) between Switzerland and the EU/EFTA starting in
2002. The reform granted EU workers full and free access to the Swiss labor
market through gradually abolishing all previous administrative and quantita-
tive restrictions on immigration. The reform in fact represented a substantial
deregulation of the labor market.27
The move towards a less restrictive migration regime also arguably alle-
viated increasingly prevalent skill shortages in the Swiss labor market.28 A look
at the scale and skill composition of persons from EU/EFTA states immigrating
into Switzerland after 2002 compared to the periods before supports this argu-
ment. Immigration of high-skilled workers surged after 2002 (SECO, BFM, BFS,
and BSV, 2014), and while it is unclear whether FMP had a positive effect on the
Figure 12: Average annual growth rates of the relative price for labor and hours worked
(1990–2013).
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, National Accounts.
27 See RUDOLF and ZURLINDEN (2010) and BASTEN and SIEGENTHALER (2013).
28 Around 1997, when demand for skilled labor rapidly increased, it became apparent that the
supply of skills of Swiss workers had not kept pace with demand (SHELDON, 2005). In the survey
of the Job Statistics the share of firms reporting shortages of workers with at least an apprentice-
ship increased from 15.6 percent in 1995 to 36.1 percent in 2001. The share of firms reporting a
shortage of workers with less education than a completed apprenticeship was always below 4
percent.
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skill composition of immigrating workers, it did have a positive effect on the
quantity of skilled workers immigrating to Switzerland.29 Evidence along these
lines is provided by BOLLI, SCHLÄPFER, and SIEGENTHALER (2015) who show that FMP
exerted a substantial positive influence on gross and net immigration to
Switzerland. Since many immigrants from EU countries were highly skilled
and came to take up employment (more than half of all immigrants already
have a job when immigrating to Switzerland), the conclusion is a positive effect
of the change in the migration regime on employment of skilled workers in
Switzerland. Other evidence in favor of the view that FMP lifted skill shortages
for Swiss firms comes from studies examining the effects of the post 2002
immigration wave on the labor market situation of residents. These studies
generally find that recent immigrants from the EU/EFTA countries had no
adverse employment effects on residents. Rather, they support the view that
immigrants were complementary to the resident workforce and filled vacancies
that might otherwise have remained open.30
Along with limiting skill shortages, the introduction of FMP possibly
decreased unit labor costs of firms, not only by limiting the increase of wages
of skilled workers,31 but also by reducing recruitment costs, thereby stimulating
employment of skilled workers. Moreover, in line with studies examining the
effect of immigration on productivity and on the composition of capital invest-
ment,32 the increased availability of adequately skilled workers and the reduc-
tion in the costs of employing them may have influenced firms’ capital
investments and technology. In particular, the introduction of FMP may have
reduced firms’ incentive to adapt labor-saving technologies or to offshore jobs to
foreign workplaces. Through these mechanisms, FMP is part of the explanation
why the labor intensity of GDP growth increased after 2002.
3.4 Switzerland’s attractiveness as a business location
The fourth driver of the Swiss “job miracle” is the fact that Switzerland became
increasingly interesting for foreign investors in general and as location for a
firm’s headquarter or an affiliate in particular. As evidenced by Figure 13,
29 CAN, RAMEL, and SHELDON (2013) recently made a similar point.
30 See CAN, RAMEL, and SHELDON (2013), BASTEN and SIEGENTHALER (2013), FAVRE (2011), FAVRE, LALIVE,
and ZWEIMÜLLER (2013) and MÜLLER, ASENSIO, and GRAF (2013).
31 See FAVRE (2011); MÜLLER, ASENSIO, and GRAF (2013) and BASTEN and SIEGENTHALER (2013).
32 See, e. g., OTTAVIANO, PERI, and WRIGHT (2013); PERI (2012) and LEWIS (2011).
The Swiss Job Miracle 71
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 28.03.17 16:03
drawing on data from the foreign direct investment (FDI) statistics of the Swiss
National Bank (SNB), the capital stock of foreign firms in Switzerland began to
increase substantially around 2005. The main series to look at is the series for
European-owned firms (straight black line) because it is only marginally affected
by the extensions of the country coverage in the SNB data, which are present in
the overall series (dotted red line). Both series, however, share the same general
pattern: Inward FDI to Switzerland displays a marked increase around 2005 and
subsequently grows at a higher rate.
The figure raises two questions: What drove the surge in inward FDI around
2005? And did it contribute to the Swiss “job miracle”? The first question is easier
to answer than the second. Switzerland’s inward FDI is disproportionally driven by
the location of research and development (R&D) units, holdings, management, or
principal headquarters in the country.33 In line with the general Swiss “tax haven”
strategy, an important reason for the increase in business locations in Switzerland
is that national and especially cantonal policies in recent years actively promoted
them, mainly by significantly lowering corporate taxes for multinational firms. The
introduction of FMP also contributed to making Switzerland more attractive for
FDI by increasing the availability of skilled workers.34
Figure 13: Capital stock of foreign firms in Switzerland (1993−2012).
Source: Swiss National Bank.
33 See ERNST & YOUNG (2013).
34 A survey by SWISSHOLDINGS (2009) among Swiss multinationals finds that “availability of
skilled manpower” along with taxes are the most important factors for the location choice for
their headquarters.
72 Michael Siegenthaler et al.
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 28.03.17 16:03
The employment effects of this inward FDI are harder to estimate because
appropriate data to tackle this question are not available. According to data from
the SNB, the number of employees in foreign owned firms increased by 143,000
persons from 2003 to 2012, representing a growth of 46 percent. This suggests a
substantial contribution of inward FDI to employment growth in Switzerland. At
the other end of the scale, a study by ECOPLAN (2013) estimates that the relocation
of firms to Switzerland in recent years created only about 1,800 domestic FTE
jobs annually. While the former statistics overstates the actual employment
effects of inward FDI and headquarter locations in Switzerland,35 the figures
cited in the ECOPLAN (2013) study are likely to underestimate the effect, as the
data insufficiently cover the actual growth of the relocated firms in the years
after a new settlement.36 Given the figures presented in this study, it is not
improbable to assume that firms relocating to Switzerland from 2008 to 2012
directly created up to 7,200 new full-time equivalent jobs annually.37 Data from
the Orell Füssli Wirtschaftsinformationen, a private company analyzing move-
ments in the Swiss commercial registry (Handelsregister), point into a similar
direction. According to these data, 12,400 new firms with a foreign owner
registered in Switzerland in 2013, creating an estimated number of 28,600 new
jobs in their first year. These numbers imply that in 2013 40 percent of all new
firms in Switzerland are registered by foreigners (increasing from 22 percent in
2000). Data for 2011 show a similar amount of jobs created by firms with a
foreign owner: 37,600 new jobs in 11,400 new firms.
35 The job growth reflected by the SNB data may also reflect mergers and acquisitions of Swiss
by foreign firms, where the effects on total employment are ambiguous.
36 The numbers in the study are taken from official data of the Konferenz der Kantonalen
Volkswirtschaftsdirektoren (VDK) about settlements of foreign firms. However, the VDK data
only count inflows of firms which came to Switzerland with support of institutions from the
national and cantonal location promotion. Other firms that relied on the help of banks or
consultants are not covered by the survey. Furthermore, the VDK data reflect only jobs created
in the first year when a firm registers in Switzerland. Data from the cantons of Geneva and Vaud
suggest that the number of FTE jobs in newly settled firms increases by factor 3.6 in the
following four years (SWISSHOLDINGS, 2009). On the other hand, the data do not contain outflows
of previously located firms. Yet, there is limited evidence that such outflows were numerous at
the time under consideration. Overall, the data are likely to substantially underestimate the net
effect of new business from abroad on employment in Switzerland.
37 The figures are calculated under two assumption. The first is that the number of jobs created
by firms not covered by the VDK data is equal to the number of jobs lost because firms left
Switzerland in a given year. The second is that the experiences from the cantons of Geneva and
Vaud about the job creation in establishments in the four years after settlement can be
generalized.
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There are two further reasons why it is likely that firm locations and inward
FDI are quantitatively important factors in explaining the Swiss “job miracle”.
The first reason is presented in Figure 14.
The figure plots an overall index of the tax burden in the main municipality of
each Swiss canton in 2001 (as published by the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration) against the number of jobs created by new (ex nihilo) businesses
in the subsequent decade (i. e. 2001–2012), expressed relative to the canton’s
initial number of jobs. Two noteworthy findings emerge from the figure. First,
new firms’ job creation was sizable in certain cantons. In the canton of Zug, new
firms created jobs equivalent to one fifth of total employment in 2001, despite
the fact that the data only count jobs created in the first year of the firms’
existence. Second, the tax burden is negatively related to job creation due to
new businesses in Switzerland. The substantial reductions in the overall tax
rates on labor income and wealth in several cantons since 200038 are therefore
likely to have spurred cantonal job growth by attracting new firms.
Figure 14: Relationship between the total tax burden in 2001 and jobs created by new business
formations (2001–2012).
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office and Swiss Federal Tax Administration.
38 Data from the Swiss Federal Tax Administration show that between 1999 and 2012 the tax
burden on an accumulated wealth of 1,000,000 Swiss francs was on average lowered by 28
percent in the cantons’ main municipalities. Similarly, the tax burden on a labor income of
100,000 Swiss francs was on average decreased by more than 13 percent. In some cantons, the
reductions on either income amounted to more than 40 percent.
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A further factor making inward FDI an important driver of the Swiss “job
miracle” is the indirect effect of attracting new firms on incumbent firms.
GREENSTONE, HORNBECK, and MORETTI (2010) show that new firms can substantially
add to employment in other local firms through spillover effects. Such multiplier
effects from inward FDI or business relocations may be due to agglomeration
economies, knowledge spillovers (MORETTI, 2011), added consumption by immi-
grating workers and capitalists as well as due to additional effects such as
increased local demand for intermediate inputs or infrastructure. Whilst such
multiplier effects could be substantial, the literature on multiplier effects of
business settlements in Switzerland is not conclusive about their size. For
instance, a study by OSEC (2008) estimates that a typical headquarter in
Switzerland directly creates 100 jobs in the medium term, and indirectly up to
350 to 400 additional full-time jobs in other firms.39
3.5 Multiplier effects of job creation in tradables
on local employment
Spillovers on local employment can be particularly sizable when attracting
foreign businesses, as argued above. But they also arise when an incumbent
firm creates a new job and fills it with a worker from abroad, because the
immigrant worker then adds to the demand for goods and services produced
or provided locally in sectors such as construction, personal services, retail
sales, education, or transportation. This multiplier effect of job growth on
local employment is the fifth driver of the “job miracle”.
Understanding the impact of local multipliers requires to distinguish
between employment in sectors producing tradable and non-tradable goods
and services. In the initial phase of the Swiss “job miracle”, it was the tradable
sector that created most new jobs, but this triggered additional employment in
non-tradables. Figure 15 illustrates this fact. It shows the cumulative change in
employment from 2005 onward, separately for tradable and non-tradable indus-
tries. Evidently, the growth of employment in tradable industries substantially
exceeded the growth of employment in non-tradable industries in absolute terms
in the years 2005 to 2008; but employment in non-tradable industries began to
39 Other studies estimate substantially smaller multipliers. The results in DELBIAGGIO and EGLI
(2012) based on four case studies suggest that, abstracting from agglomeration effects, for one
job created in a new firm, between 0.01 and 0.88 additional jobs follow through indirect and
induced effects in other firms. See also HASKEL, PEREIRA, and SLAUGHTER (2007).
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increase substantially in 2007, with a perceivable lag to employment growth in
the tradables sector.40
In the following, we formally assess whether job growth in the tradables
sector caused job growth in the non-tradables sector. To this end, we apply a
theoretical and empirical framework developed by MORETTI (2010). He analyzed
“local multipliers” in US cities and found that every time a new job in a city’s
tradables sector was created, 1.6 additional jobs were created in this city’s non-
tradables sector. Following his framework, we study the size of the long-run
cantonal multiplier in Switzerland by estimating a set of OLS and instrumental
variable (IV) regressions relating cantonal employment growth in the non-trad-
ables sectors to employment growth in the tradables sector. The data are taken
from the Swiss Wage Structure Surveys 1996, 1998, 2004, and 2010. The regres-
sions take the following form:
Figure 15: Cumulative change in employment relative to 2005 in the tradable and non-tradables
sector (2006–2013).
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
40 Evidence in favor of the idea that tradable employment growth led non-tradable employ-
ment growth throughout the “job miracle” is also provided by ECOPLAN (2013), looking at gross
immigration of employees by NOGA sections (NACE, rev. 2) over the period from 2002−2012. It is
shown that the manufacturing, information and communication technologies sectors, and in
particular professional, scientific and technical activities contributed to the increased immigra-
tion in the three years after the recession of 2003. On the other hand, immigration into the
sectors construction, wholesale and retail trade, transportation, storage, accommodation and
personal services did not surge before 2006.
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ΔNctNT = α+ βΔNctT + τt + ect, [3]
where ΔNct
NT denotes growth of employment in the non-tradables sector in
canton c from period t−1 to t, and ΔNct
T represents the corresponding employ-
ment growth in the tradables sector.41 We refer to two observations per canton,
representing employment growth over the seven-year period 1997–2004 and the
six-year period 2004–2010.42 Note that τt accounts for period effects equally
affecting employment growth in all cantons in the two time periods. Similarly,
all time-invariant factors equally affecting cantonal employment growth in both
periods are accounted for since the regression is in first differences. As ΔNct
N
and ΔNct
NT may both be driven by common omitted third factors, such as
changes in regional labor supply or cantonal policies, we instrument tradable
job growth using a shift-share instrumental variable (IV). The strategy amounts
to exploiting nationwide growth in employment in detailed tradable (two-digit)
industries j,43 and to translate these national shifts in industry employment
growth into cantonal labor demand shocks by multiplying them with the begin-
ning-of-period share of industry j in total tradable employment in the canton c.
The idea is that different cantons are differently affected by nationwide industry-
specific shocks to tradables, depending on the beginning-of-period industry
composition of the tradables sector. The instrument for the growth in tradable
employment in canton c is then calculated by summing up the predicted
cantonal employment changes across the j industries.44
The local multipliers received from estimating the model of equation 3 by
OLS and IV are shown in Table 2. Inference is robust to clustering on the
cantonal level.
The first column illustrates that a 10 percent increase in tradable employ-
ment in a canton increases employment in the non-tradables sector by 5 percent.
41 Similar as SACHS and SHATZ (1996), we proxy the tradables sector by all manufacturing
industries plus electricity and water supply, as well as certain business services (banking,
insurance, information and communication technologies, real estate, R&D, and business-related
services). The sector “public administration” is dropped. The tradables sector hence consists of
NACE rev. 1.1 industries 10–37, 65–67, 70 and 72–74. The remaining service sector industries
comprise the non-tradables sector.
42 We pool the wage structure surveys in 1996 and 1998 in order to have a sufficient number of
observations per canton to compute cantonal employment. This is relevant for the strength of
the instrument.
43 We have redone the analysis building the instrument on the three-digit level of the indus-
trial classification with very similar results.
44 More formally, for the period 1997–2004, the instrument is ∑j wjcΔNjt
T, where wjc represents
the employment share of industry j in total tradable employment in canton c in 1997, and ΔNjt
T
is the Swiss-wide growth of employment in detailed tradable industry j.
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Since the number of non-tradable jobs exceeds the number of tradable jobs in
Switzerland by factor 1.4 given our sector definition, this estimate implies that
an additional job in the tradables sector creates 0.68 additional jobs in the non-
tradables sector, as follows from the second-last row of Table 2. This estimate
implies a cantonal multiplier lower than the city-level multiplier in the US, but
exceeding the regional multiplier in Sweden of around 0.5, as estimated by
MORETTI and THULIN (2013).
Columns 2–4 illustrate that the finding of a positive cantonal multiplier of
tradable employment growth is robust. In the second column, the cantonal
observations are weighted according to total (tradable and non-tradable) canto-
nal employment in t−1 (WLS regression). The estimated cantonal multiplier
decreases to 0.6 in this specification, which does not affect the interpretation
in qualitative terms.
In the third column, the cantonal multiplier is instrumented using the shift-
share instrument. This leads to an increase in the estimated multiplier compared
to the corresponding WLS estimate of the second column. The IV estimate of the
local multiplier indicates that 0.9 additional non-tradable jobs are created per
Table 2: OLS and IV regression estimates of cantonal multipliers on employment in non-
tradable industries (1997–2010).
VARIABLES () () () () () ()
FD FD FD IV FD IV FD IV FD
Imm. Imm.
ΔNTct .*** .*** .*** .*** .***
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
ΔITct .***
(.)
ΔRTct .
(.)
Observations      
R . . . −. . .
Period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weights No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Jobs per trad. job . . . . .
F stat. first stage . . .
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; Dependent
variable in columns 1−4: growth of employment in the tradables sector; dependent variable in
columns 5 and 6: growth of employment of recent immigrants in the tradables sector.
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new tradable job created in a canton.45 In the fourth column, we slightly refine
the shift-share instrument following a suggestion by MORETTI and THULIN (2013).46
This refined instrument is not strong enough if we weight observations accord-
ing to cantonal employment. However, it works well if the weights are omitted,
probably because down-weighting of small cantons strongly reduces the pre-
dictive power of the instrument. The estimated cantonal multiplier further
increases in this specification to 1.4, thus reaching levels as high as the city-
level multiplier in the US estimated by MORETTI (2010).
In Table 3, we show our cantonal multiplier estimates with the tradable
industries. To this end, we randomly select half of the tradable industries and
estimate their local multiplier on the other half of the tradable industries.
Table 3: OLS and IV regression estimates of cantonal multipliers on employment in tradable
industries (1997–2010).
VARIABLES () () () () () ()
FD FD FD IV FD IV FD IV FD
Imm. Imm.
ΔNTct . .* .** . .**
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
ΔITct .*
(.)
ΔRTct −.
(.)
Observations      
R . . . . −. .
Period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weights No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Jobs per trad. job . . . . .
F stat. first stage . . .
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; Dependent
variable in columns 1−4: growth of employment in the tradables sector; dependent variable in
columns 5 and 6: growth of employment of recent immigrants in the tradables sector
45 However, note that the cluster-robust F-statistics of the first stage is 8.4, hence potentially
indicating a problem of weak instruments.
46 In particular, in order to purge the influence of the cantonal employment change in an
industry on the nationwide employment change in that industry from the instrument, we
subtract the industry’s cantonal employment change from the nationwide employment change
in the industry.
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Looking at columns 1–4 of Table 3, the results are generally in line with
MORETTI (2010) and MORETTI and THULIN (2013), indicating that the local multiplier
among tradables is relatively low compared to the effect on non-tradables,
imprecisely estimated and low in absolute terms too. According to Moretti’s
model, the reason for this is that additional jobs in the tradables sector increase
demand from other local firms in the tradable industry only if value chains are
localized or agglomeration economies (i. e. local productivity spillovers) exist.
Otherwise, the initial employment increase in tradables puts upward pressure on
local wages for workers in the tradables sector, which tends to reduce local
tradable employment.
How do the estimated cantonal multipliers relate to the national multiplier?
The theoretical framework of MORETTI (2010) gives important clues. On the one
hand, the locally measured multiplier for tradable job growth on tradable
employment is a lower bound for the national multiplier, because the demand
effects of an additional job in a specific canton benefits firms in other cantons as
well, owing to the national product market of tradables. On the other hand, the
local estimate of the multiplier of tradables on non-tradables is likely to con-
stitute an upper bound for the national multiplier, because labor is more mobile
at the local than at the national level. In the extreme case of completely inelastic
labor supply at the national level, any job created locally would result in a job
loss elsewhere.
In Switzerland, however, labor supply at the national level is of course
elastic. Firms always recruited workers abroad, and could so more easily due
to free movement of persons. This implies that jobs created in the tradables
sector could cause immigration by increasing local demand for non-tradables.
This mechanism is studied in columns 5 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3. The outcome
variable considered in these regressions is growth in cantonal employment of
recent immigrants in the non-tradables sector (Table 2) or in the tradables sector
(Table 3).47 Both estimations instrument tradable employment growth applying
the same IV as in the respective third column. They provide evidence in favor of
the notion that tradable job growth fuels immigration.
Columns 5 indicate that 10 jobs created in a canton’s tradable industry
attract 2.5 immigrants into the canton’s non-tradable and slightly more than
one immigrant into the canton’s tradables sector.
47 Since the data set does not contain a variable indicating where employees were born, the
sample is split according to residency permits. Foreign nationals with a C (permanent residency)
permit and cross-border commuters are not treated as immigrants. All other permit categories
are treated as recent immigrants.
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Finally, the last column presents WLS regressions of the same dependent
variable, splitting employment growth in the tradables sector into the contribu-
tions of recent immigrants (ΔIct
T) and residents (ΔRct
T). The estimate in the sixth
column of Table 2 implies that a 10 percent growth of employment of recent
immigrants in the tradables sector increases employment of immigrants in the
non-tradables sector by 3.3 percent. The estimated elasticity for residents has a
similar magnitude, but is not statistically significant. Because an increase by 10
jobs represents a much larger relative increase in employment for recent immi-
grants than for residents, the estimated elasticity indeed implies that 10 addi-
tional jobs filled by immigrants in a canton’s tradables sector create about 6.6
additional jobs for immigrants in the canton’s non-tradables sector, as there are
twice as many recent immigrant employees in non-tradable compared to trad-
able industries. In Table 3, the estimated elasticity for recent immigrants
amounts to 0.57, but the simultaneous elasticity for incumbent workers is
negative (with a huge standard error), so that the joint effect for the tradable
sector is harder to quantify.
Without stressing the findings from our local multiplier regressions and
their numerical precision too much, we feel confident to conclude that job
creation based on immigration is likely to have triggered further immigration.
3.6 The relevance of immigration
Our approach to study the Swiss “job miracle” allows to highlight the various
interactions of recent migration and economic change in Switzerland. At the
same time, a quantification of the relative importance of each of the driving
forces in accounting for the “job miracle” is not feasible on this basis. In
qualitative terms, however, while it is most likely that each of the factors
contributed to the “job miracle”, we feel confident enough to conclude that
catch-up employment growth (driver 1) and the evolution of relative factor prices
(driver 2) will mainly have affected the early phase of the “job miracle”, explain-
ing a large share of the substantial increase in tradable employment in this
period. However, our analysis suggests that as the “job miracle” gained momen-
tum, immigration and changes in immigration policy played a central role in
strengthening and reinforcing the growth of hours worked, not the least through
the multiplier effects established in the preceding section.
The central role of immigration is also affirmed by the estimations in the
Appendix, as we can explain a substantial part of the forecast errors in KOF’s
employment forecasts by considering variables related to FMP and labor force
growth (which in turn is driven by net migration).
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Apart from causing and reinforcing the “job miracle”, immigration was also
its prerequisite: Switzerland’s resident labor force would not have been suffi-
ciently large to enable employment of an additional 714′000 persons between
2000 and 2013. Indeed, the potential to increase the employment of the incum-
bent population were quite limited: with an employment rate of persons aged
15–64 amounting to 81.1% and an unemployment rate of 2.7% in 2000, the
domestic labor market was practically already stretched to its limits. The “job
miracle” would not have taken place without growth of the resident labor force
through immigration. The consequence of this is shown in Figure 16. It plots an
index of Switzerland’s labor force from 1991 to 2013, separately for Swiss
nationals, Swiss nationals excluding naturalized foreigners, and foreign nationals
including naturalized foreigners. When accounting for naturalizations, virtually
the entire increase in the Swiss labor force between 2000 and 2013 – a plus of
858,000 persons ( + 20.6%) – is accounted for by an increase of the foreign labor
force. 75 percent of the growth of the foreign labor force since 1999 can, in turn,
be attributed to net immigration of foreign nationals into the labor force.
4 Summary and conclusions
In the last decade total hours worked in Switzerland have grown substantially.
This increase went along with a pronounced growth of the number of employ-
ees. This job creation not only represents a substantial change from the
Figure 16: Indices of labor force size by nationality (1991–2013).
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, own calculations.
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preceding decade, in which employment in Switzerland stagnated; it was also
high from an international perspective.
Understanding the drivers and results of the Swiss “job miracle” is of utmost
relevance, both from a macroeconomic perspective, which opens a wide range of
questions, as well as for applied discussions, given that the recent immigration
wave into Switzerland is meeting an increasingly politicized and sometimes
outright xenophobic discourse. While the majority of newly created jobs were
filled with immigrants, the incumbent population may have profited as well,
provided the migrants were equipped with skills that are complementary to
those of the locals. Although we could not address all consequences of this
Swiss “job miracle” in detail, we deliver insights into the underlying economic
forces that ultimately determine the range of outcomes that are open to the
political process.
In particular, we find that the Swiss “job miracle” has the following char-
acteristics: (1) solid average wage growth, (2) a trend towards a higher labor
intensity and a lower capital-intensity of economic activity, (3) an elimination of
the previous trade-off between productivity growth and job growth, (4) a con-
tinuous shift in labor demand towards higher skills.
We then highlight five factors as the main drivers of the Swiss “job miracle”:
(1) catch-up employment growth as a result of the long and severe recession of
the 1990s, (2) moderate increases in the price of labor relative to capital, (3) the
free movement of persons (FMP) between Switzerland and the EU/EFTA starting
in 2002, (4) Switzerland’s attractiveness as a business location and the resulting
attraction of new firms from abroad and (5) multiplier effects of job creation in
tradables on local employment.
Although these drivers are discussed separately, they are of course inter-
related and may have reinforced each other. For instance, the catch-up employ-
ment growth after the recession of the 1990s may have been accelerated and
magnified by the introduction of free movement of persons, as the reform
aligned labor supply and labor demand, reduced recruitment and unit labor
costs for skilled workers, and increased the flexibility of Switzerland’s labor
market. These effects of FMP, however, did not manifest themselves rapidly in
aggregate employment figures, partly because Switzerland’s economy stagnated
from 2001 to 2003, and partly because the introduction of the free movement
regime occurred stepwise. Once immigration gained momentum, however, the
local multiplier kicked in and exerted a reinforcing influence.
The story told here is a Swiss one; but its relevance is not restricted to
Switzerland. It offers lessons to all economies facing substantial net migration
inflows. Maybe the two most important ones from a general perspective are
(1) that substantial employment growth is feasible without wage restraint and
The Swiss Job Miracle 83
Bereitgestellt von | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 28.03.17 16:03
(2) that when labor markets are tight migration may trigger additional migration
due to local demand for non-tradable goods and services.
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Appendix
Do our findings explain the job growth forecast errors?
This appendix examines the extent to which our findings in Sections 2 and 3 help
explain why forecasters systematically underestimated job growth in Switzerland.
To this end, we run OLS regressions of KOF’s FTE job growth forecast errors with a
horizon of one and two quarters on a number of potential explanatory variables,
where et+ h,t represents the forecast error for horizon t+ h and Xt a vector of
explanatory variables:
et + h, t = γ0 + γ1Xt + ct [4]
The regression statistics for the one- and two-quarters-ahead forecasts are
shown in Tables A.1 and A.2.
Given our discussion of the recent structural changes of the Swiss econ-
omy, we would expect that a major part of the bias in the forecasts will result
from an underestimation of the labor intensity of GDP growth, and not from an
underestimation of GDP growth itself. In the first column of Table A.1, we thus
regress the forecast errors in the growth rate of FTE jobs on the forecast errors
of the GDP growth rate. Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficients show that
there is a positive correlation between the GDP and the employment forecast
errors, i. e. KOF underestimated job growth whenever it underestimated GDP
growth and vice versa. More importantly, however, accounting for the GDP
forecast errors does not eliminate the downward bias in the forecast of FTE
job growth, as can be seen from the statistically significantly positive regres-
sion constant. Job growth was thus consistently underestimated for any GDP
growth rate.
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Table A.2: Determinants of the two-quarters-ahead forecast errors (OLS regressions for h = 2).
VARIABLES () () () () () ()
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
ΔGDP, t + 2 forecast error .** .** .** .** .** .**
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Free movement of persons
(stepwise)
.** .** .** . .**
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
ΔPot. labor force, t+ 2 forecast error .** .**
(.) (.)
ΔProductivity, t + 2 forecast .** .**
(.) (.)
Investment/GDP, t +  forecast −. −.
(.) (.)
Constant .** −. −.* −. . −.
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Observations      
R . . . . . .
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; Dependent variable: two
quarters ahead forecast error in quarter-on-quarter growth of FTE jobs.
Table A.1: Determinants of the one-quarter-ahead forecast errors (OLS regressions for h = 1).
VARIABLES () () () () () ()
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
ΔGDP, t + 1 forecast error .** .** .** .** .** .**
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Free movement of persons
(stepwise)
.** .** .** .* .**
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
ΔPot. labor force, t+ 1 forecast error . .**
(.) (.)
ΔProductivity, t+ 1 forecast .** .**
(.) (.)
Investment/GDP, t+ forecast −. .
(.) (.)
Constant .** −. −. −. −. −.*
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Observations      
R . . . . . .
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; Dependent variable: one
quarter ahead forecast error in quarter-on-quarter growth of FTE jobs.
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Moreover, if the introduction of free movement of persons with the EU/EFTA
was a major cause of structural change, the emergence of the forecast bias
should coincide with the introduction of FMP. Column 2 confirms this hypoth-
esis. In particular, we add a regressor that is constructed to mirror the three
steps in the gradual introduction of FMP with the EU-15/EFTA countries.48 This
variable turns out to be statistically significant, and it completely eliminates the
bias in the job growth forecast.
Column 3 examines the related hypothesis that the forecasters underesti-
mated population growth and accordingly also employment growth. We exam-
ine this hypothesis by comparing the factual with the forecasted growth rates of
the potential labor force. This is the KOF forecast of the part of the working age
population (i. e. the Swiss population aged between 20 and 64 years) which is
willing to participate in the labor market. Indeed, KOF repeatedly underesti-
mated population and, along with this, potential labor force growth.49 The
resulting forecast errors are added as an explanatory variable. Column 3
shows that this regressor has the expected positive relationship to the forecast
errors of job growth: The larger the underestimation of population growth, the
larger the job growth forecast errors.
Now recall the evidence presented in Figure 10, which implies that produc-
tivity and employment growth have become positively associated in the course
of the 2000s, whilst they were negatively associated before. The structural break
would imply that while forecasters relied on a long-standing negative trade-off
between productivity and job growth, this trade-off was actually not present
anymore. If this were the case, one could use KOF’s actual labor productivity
growth forecast to explain the FTE job growth forecast error. Column 4 shows
that there is indeed a strong positive association between the KOF forecasts of
average labor productivity growth and the forecast errors relating to the growth
of jobs. This implies that whenever predicted labor productivity growth was
high, KOF’s underestimation of job growth ended up to be particularly sizable.
48 The variable is coded as zero from the beginning of the time series. It takes the value of 1/3
in June 2002, when a limited free movement regime became effective. In mid-2004, the value
increases to 2/3, since several limitations to free movement were eliminated. With all barriers to
immigration fully lifted in June 2007, the value is set to 1.
49 Forecasts of the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of this measure lay approximately 15 percent
below the de facto growth rate over the whole sample. Since the growth of the Swiss residents
working age population can be quite accurately predicted by considering age cohort effects, a
bias in the forecast errors of this variable must be mostly attributed to wrong assessments of the
net migration of workers.
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Accordingly, the forecasters failed to perceive the structural change in the
association between productivity and job growth.50
Now recall also that Figure 11 suggests that the association between invest-
ment and job growth became more positive. Following the same reasoning as
with the labor productivity forecasts, we can thus use actual KOF forecasts of the
investment rate in order to explain the forecast error for job growth. Yet,
according to column 5 the investment rate forecasts do not explain the job
growth forecast errors beyond what already is accounted for by the GDP forecast
errors.
Finally, Column 6 reports the regression with all explanatory variables
added simultaneously. The important message from this regression is that we
can explain most of the bias as well as roughly two thirds of the variation in the
one step ahead forecast errors of job growth in the period under examination by
introducing the variables presented.
Moreover, the results shown in Table A.2, which replicates the regressions
reported in Table A.1 for a forecast horizon of two quarters are similar to this in
Table A.1, or even more in favor of our explanations for the forecast errors. We
thus have identified some key factors and relationships that escaped the atten-
tion of the forecasters in real time.
50 Since the regression intercept should represent the mean forecasting error, we normalize
forecasted productivity growth to have a mean of zero over the whole sample period before
running the regression shown in Column 5. The same applies to the investment rate.
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